Politische Onlinezensur als Verfassungsfrage

CK • Washington. Eine bekloppte Präsidentschaftskandidatin verklagte einen Onlinedienst wegen seiner Unterdrückung ihrer Werbung, die sie als Verletzung ihrer verfassungsgeschützten Meinungsfreiheit bezeichnete. Am 3. März 2020 flog ihre abstruse Rüge in Tulsi Now Inc. v. Google LLC aus dem Bundesgericht erster Instanz, das seine Begründung auf ältere Rechtsprechung des Supreme Court in Washington und die nagelneue Entscheidung des Bundesberufungsgerichts im neunten Bezirks der USA in San Francisco vom 26. Februar 2020 in Prager University v. Google LLC zum First Amendment stützte:

Erstens sei der Dienst nicht der Staat, zweitens falle seine Zensur nicht in die traditionell ausschließlich dem Staat zugeordneten Verantwortungsbereiche, und drittens gef&ajml;rde der Dienst nicht das Verfassungsrecht der Kandidatur und damit verbundener Äußerungen. Das Gericht folgert, dass die den Staat bindende Meinungsfreiheit nichts mit privater Zensur zu tun habe. Letzterem widerspricht Prof. Goldman mit dem korrekten Hinweis, dass die private Zensur sehr wohl vom selben Verfassungsprinzip geschützt ist. Das Bundesgericht des Mittelbezirks von Kalifornien erklärte unter anderem:

Plaintiff alleges Google has become a state actor by virtue of providing advertising services surrounding the 2020 presidential election. "Under this Court's cases, a private entity can qualify as a state actor in a few limited circumstances--including, for example, (i) when the private entity performs a traditional, exclusive public function; (ii) when the government compels the private entity to take a particular action; or (iii) when the government acts jointly with the private entity." … Plaintiff's argument is that, by regulating political advertising on its own platform, Google exercised the traditional government function of regulating elections. "To draw the line between governmental and private, this Court applies what is known as the state-action doctrine. Under that doctrine, as relevant here, a private entity may be considered a state actor when it exercises a function 'traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.'" …

Traditional government functions are defined narrowly. "It is not enough that the federal, state, or local government exercised the function in the past, or still does. And it is not enough that the function serves the public good or the public interest in some way. Rather, to qualify as a traditional, exclusive public function within the meaning of our state-action precedents, the government must have traditionally and exclusively performed the function. … Under the Court's cases, those functions include, for example, running elections and operating a company town." There is no argument that webservices or online political advertising are traditionally exclusive government functions. Plaintiff argues that, by providing some restriction on political advertising on its platform, Google is in effect regulating elections.

…What Plaintiff fails to establish is how Google's regulation of its own platform is in any way equivalent to a governmental regulation of an election. Google does not hold primaries, it does not select candidates, and it does not prevent anyone from running for office or voting in elections. To the extent Google "regulates" anything, it regulates its own private speech and platform. Plaintiff's "national security" argument similarly fails. Google protects itself from foreign interference; it does not act as an agent of the United States. Nearly every media or technology company has some form of cybersecurity procedure. Under Plaintiff's theory, every media organization that took steps to prevent foreign cybercrimes could potentially implicate the First Amendment. Google's self-regulation, even of topics that may be of public concern, does not implicate the First Amendment.